dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092 2/4]
GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies
them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over
all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a
potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with
a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly
calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory.
This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname
lists for X access control are insane.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit bc8e20430b
)
Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
b022d4ef9d
commit
cbfdb284c9
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@ -1323,6 +1323,10 @@ GetHosts(void **data, int *pnHosts, int *pLen, BOOL * pEnabled)
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for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) {
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nHosts++;
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n += pad_to_int32(host->len) + sizeof(xHostEntry);
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/* Could check for INT_MAX, but in reality having more than 1mb of
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hostnames in the access list is ridiculous */
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if (n >= 1048576)
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break;
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}
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if (n) {
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*data = ptr = malloc(n);
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@ -1331,6 +1335,8 @@ GetHosts(void **data, int *pnHosts, int *pLen, BOOL * pEnabled)
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}
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for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) {
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len = host->len;
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if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > (data + n))
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break;
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((xHostEntry *) ptr)->family = host->family;
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((xHostEntry *) ptr)->length = len;
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ptr += sizeof(xHostEntry);
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