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Backport #30790 by archer-321 This commit forces the resource owner (user) to always approve OAuth 2.0 authorization requests if the client is public (e.g. native applications). As detailed in [RFC 6749 Section 10.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749.html#section-10.2), > The authorization server SHOULD NOT process repeated authorization requests automatically (without active resource owner interaction) without authenticating the client or relying on other measures to ensure that the repeated request comes from the original client and not an impersonator. With the implementation prior to this patch, attackers with access to the redirect URI (e.g., the loopback interface for `git-credential-oauth`) can get access to the user account without any user interaction if they can redirect the user to the `/login/oauth/authorize` endpoint somehow (e.g., with `xdg-open` on Linux). Fixes #25061. Co-authored-by: Archer <archer@beezig.eu> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
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@ -468,8 +468,9 @@ func AuthorizeOAuth(ctx *context.Context) {
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return
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return
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}
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}
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// Redirect if user already granted access
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// Redirect if user already granted access and the application is confidential.
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if grant != nil {
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// I.e. always require authorization for public clients as recommended by RFC 6749 Section 10.2
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if app.ConfidentialClient && grant != nil {
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code, err := grant.GenerateNewAuthorizationCode(ctx, form.RedirectURI, form.CodeChallenge, form.CodeChallengeMethod)
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code, err := grant.GenerateNewAuthorizationCode(ctx, form.RedirectURI, form.CodeChallenge, form.CodeChallengeMethod)
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if err != nil {
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if err != nil {
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handleServerError(ctx, form.State, form.RedirectURI)
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handleServerError(ctx, form.State, form.RedirectURI)
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