CVE-2008-2360 - RENDER Extension heap buffer overflow
An integer overflow may occur in the computation of the size of the glyph to be allocated by the AllocateGlyph() function which will cause less memory to be allocated than expected, leading to later heap overflow. On systems where the X SIGSEGV handler includes a stack trace, more malloc()-type functions are called, which may lead to other exploitable issues.
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@ -42,6 +42,12 @@
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#include "picturestr.h"
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#include "glyphstr.h"
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#if HAVE_STDINT_H
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#include <stdint.h>
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#elif !defined(UINT32_MAX)
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#define UINT32_MAX 0xffffffffU
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#endif
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/*
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* From Knuth -- a good choice for hash/rehash values is p, p-2 where
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* p and p-2 are both prime. These tables are sized to have an extra 10%
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@ -626,8 +632,12 @@ AllocateGlyph (xGlyphInfo *gi, int fdepth)
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int size;
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GlyphPtr glyph;
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int i;
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size = gi->height * PixmapBytePad (gi->width, glyphDepths[fdepth]);
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size_t padded_width;
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padded_width = PixmapBytePad (gi->width, glyphDepths[fdepth]);
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if (gi->height && padded_width > (UINT32_MAX - sizeof(GlyphRec))/gi->height)
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return 0;
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size = gi->height * padded_width;
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glyph = (GlyphPtr) xalloc (size + sizeof (GlyphRec));
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if (!glyph)
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return 0;
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