Xi: integer overflow and unvalidated length in (S)ProcXIBarrierReleasePointer

[jcristau: originally this patch fixed the same issue as commit
 211e05ac85 "Xi: Test exact size of XIBarrierReleasePointer", with the
 addition of these checks]

This addresses CVE-2017-12179

Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Kidd <nkidd@opentext.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
This commit is contained in:
Nathan Kidd 2015-01-09 10:04:41 -05:00 committed by Julien Cristau
parent 1b1d4c0469
commit d088e3c128
1 changed files with 5 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@ -834,6 +834,8 @@ SProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client)
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq);
swapl(&stuff->num_barriers);
if (stuff->num_barriers > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo))
return BadLength;
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq, stuff->num_barriers * sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo));
info = (xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo*) &stuff[1];
@ -856,6 +858,9 @@ ProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client)
xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo *info;
REQUEST(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq);
if (stuff->num_barriers > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo))
return BadLength;
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq, stuff->num_barriers * sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo));
info = (xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo*) &stuff[1];